THAT EXPOSURE to or ingestion of chemicals can produce or exacerbate disease is a welldocumented and accepted tenet of modem medicine. There is no question that environmentally related illness can result from immunologic sensitization, various physical factors, infection or direct toxic or pharmacological effects of natural and synthetic substances (Upton, 1990) . Specialists in fields such as allergy and clinical immunology, clinical toxicology, neurotoxicology and occupational medicine clearly demonstrate adverse effects associated with exposure to chemicals in well-documented, critically reviewed, scientific publications (Frank et al., 1985; Gammage & Kaye, 1985;  Hathaway, Proctor, Hughes, & Fischman, 1991; National Research Council, 1992 ; National Institutes of Health [NIH], 1984) .
These diseases generally present with characteristic symptoms and pathology, but in recent years, physicians of various specialties noted a rising number of patients presenting with vague, multisystem somatic complaints characteristic of general malaise (see Table 1 ). Despite a comprehensive medical history, physical examination, laboratory tests and careful clinical observation, many of these cases fail to show concrete signs of organic disease (Terr, 1986 (Terr, , 1989 (Sparks et al., 1993) . The polysomatic symptoms of these patients are strikingly similar to the gen- (Barsky & Klerman, 1983; Quill, 1985; e.g ., see Shorter's [1992] discussion on neurasthenia). Much of the evidence suggests that psychological mechanisms are at the root of some patients' beliefs in environmental illness and the accompanying symptoms (Black, Rathe, & Goldstein, 1990; Brodsky, 1983; Selner, J. C., & Staudenmayer, 1986 & Staudenmayer, , 1992a & Staudenmayer, , 1992b Selner, J. C., Staudenmayer, Koepke, Harvey, & Christopher, 1987; Simon, Daniell, Stockbridge, Claypoole, & Rosenstock, 1993; Simon, Katon, & Sparks, 1990 Kahn & Letz, 1989; Terr, 1987; Thompson, 1985) and which also incur great financial, occupational and psychological cost to the patient (Black, 1993 (Barsky, Goodson, Lane, & Cleary, 1988; Lipowski, 1988; Pennebaker & Watson, 1991; Robbins & Kirmayer, 1986) . Proponents of the EI/MCS phenomenon have advanced hypotheses about biological individual differences which could explain the subjective reality of such disorders (Ashford & Miller, 1991) . For example, the heightened sensation hypothesis suggests that certain individuals may have sensory thresholds lower than others. In the context of the EI/MCS phenomenon, such individuals are assumed to suffer from chemical hypersensitivity (Morrow, Ryan, Goldstein, & Hodgson, 1989; Ryan, Morrow, & Hodgson, 1988) . In controlled studies, however, EI/MCS patients do not show olfactory thresholds lower than other subject populations (Doty, Deems, Frye, Pelberg, & Shapiro, 1988) . In fact, food imagery in the absence of odors had the same effect on the electroencephalogram (EEG) as when food odors were physically present (Lorig, 1989) , suggesting that odor perception is cognitively mediated.
Another explanation for environmental illness focuses on limbic kindling in the central nervous system (Ashford & Miller, 1991) . Limbic kin- dling is based on an animal model for seizure disorders induced by stimulation with electrical current or high doses of a pharmacologic agent (Gilbert, 1992a (Gilbert, , 1992b . However, no evidence for the phenomenon has been presented in humans. In fact, the limbic kindling model has been revised to require only 'partial' kindling (Bell, Miller, & Schwartz, 1992) (Bell et al., 1992) .
Classic application of Pavlovian reflex conditioning has also been used to explain adverse reactions to environmental stimuli (Djuric & Bienenstock, 1993; MacQueen, Marshall, Perdue, Siefel, & Bienenstock, 1989; Russell et al., 1984 (Brewin, 1989; Dickinson, 1987 (Rescorla, 1988 (Selner & Staudenmayer, 1992b (Barsky et al., 1988; Pennebaker & Watson, 1991 (Mendelson, 1987) , as well as limits on memory processes which may result in partial, rather than full, reporting of symptoms. Such factors are particularly germane to EI/MCS patients (Staudenmayer & Selner, 1995) . Because these patients frequently encounter disbelief when dealing with doctors, many become wary of dealing with the mainstream medical community. For these patients, a more indirect method than direct questioning may be an attractive alternative. The approach we propose has potential for decreasing the patients' reactivity to the process of obtaining information, as well as demands on recall.
In summary, many of the studies in this area are concerned with the impact of people's conceptions of illness on their behaviors regarding the illness. Although this work is clearly related to our work on the role of beliefs in psychosomatic disorders, our emphasis is more on the causal role of beliefs in such illness than on the role of beliefs or schemata in patients' reactions to medical conditions. We now turn to a discussion of empirically derived network representations and their potential applicability as a means for assessing the mental representation of beliefs.
An empirical approach to representing beliefs
The Pathfinder network scaling algorithm (Schvaneveldt, 1990; Schvaneveldt, Durso, & Dearholt, 1989) (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1976; Quillian, 1969 (Cooke, 1992; Cooke, Durso, & Schvaneveldt, 1986) , learning (Gomez & Schvaneveldt, 1994), problem-solving (Durso, Rea, & Dayton, 1994) , representation of the cognitive structures underlying expertise (Cooke & Schvaneveldt, 1988) , and assessment of knowledge growth for academic subject matter (Goldsmith & Johnson, 1990; Housner, Gomez, & Griffey, 1993a , 1993b Table 2 . The ratings were collected on a 9-point relatedness scale, where '1' corresponded to 'unrelated' and '9' corresponded to 'highly related'. The pairs were presented in a random order.
Results and Discussion
Group average networks First, average networks for each group were computed from averaging the z-score transformations of each individual participant's data. In all analyses, r was set at infinity, and q was set to n -1 (or 23). These parameter values only require ordinal assumptions of the data, and the networks with the fewest links are produced. The average EI/ MCS patient network is shown in Figure 2 Brodsky (1983) ( Figure 6) (Table 3) . Both predictions were supported in the data. First, individuals in the allergy, asthma, doctor and control groups Next, individual Pathfinder networks were compared to the prototype EI/MCS network (see Figure 1 ) using a network similarity index (NETSIM). NETSIM is based on the expected similarity between networks and is computed in the following manner. First, the observed similarity is computed by dividing the number of links shared by both networks (those in the intersection of the links) by the number of links in either network (the number of links in the union). Next, because the probability that two networks will share x links can be computed from the hypergeometric probability distribution, this information can be used to compute the expected number of links in common between two networks. The expected similarity is subtracted from the observed similarity between two networks to get the NETSIM index which is relative to the chance level of similarity (NETSIM = 0). Thus, networks more similar than chance will yield positive NETSIM values, and networks less similar than chance will yield negative NETSIM values. Comparing individuals to the EI/MCS prototype (shown in Figure  1 ), we should find higher NETSIM values for EI/MCS patients than for the other subject groups. The mean NETSIM values are shown in (Selner, 1989) . Psychological assessment is usually recommended only after the medical examinations and assessments are completed and often only if there is a failure to confirm a medical diagnosis (Selner & Staudenmayer, 1985) . It 
